|

SUBSCRIBERS
    
Advertise with us |
 |

ELLIOTT WAVE ANALYSIS
Updated daily


Robert Prechter
Explains the
Price Effects of
Inflation and
Deflation
November 19,
2008
Editor’s
Note: On Nov.
19, 2008, the
U.S. Labor
Department
reported a 1
percent drop in
the consumer
price index for
October 2008.
The drop marked
the largest
decline in 61
years, and it
was the first
decline in that
measure in
nearly a quarter
of a century.
The 1 percent
drop was twice
as large as many
mainstream
analysts had
forecast. Such a
large decline in
consumer prices
is forcing U.S.
policymakers to
rethink the
possibility of
deflation in
America. For
more on
deflation, we
turn to Robert
Prechter, the
man who
literally wrote
a book on how to
survive it. The
following
article, adapted
from Prechter’s
book Conquer the
Crash – You Can
Survive and
Prosper in a
Deflationary
Depression, will
help you
understand
exactly what to
expect from
deflation.
In addition
to this article,
visit Elliott
Wave
International to
download the
free 8-page
report,
Inflation vs.
Deflation.
It contains
details on which
threat you
should prepare
for and steps
you can take to
protect your
money.
By Robert
Prechter, CMT
Before
explaining the
price effects of
inflation and
deflation, we
must define the
terms inflation,
deflation,
money, credit
and debt.
Webster's
says, "Inflation
is an increase
in the volume of
money and credit
relative to
available
goods," and "Deflation
is a contraction
in the volume of
money and credit
relative to
available
goods."
Money
is a socially
accepted medium
of exchange,
value storage
and final
payment. A
specified amount
of that medium
also serves as a
unit of account.
According to
its two
financial
definitions,
credit may
be summarized as
a right to
access money.
Credit can be
held by the
owner of the
money, in the
form of a
warehouse
receipt for a
money deposit,
which today is a
checking account
at a bank.
Credit can also
be
transferred
by the owner or
by the owner's
custodial
institution to a
borrower in
exchange for a
fee or fees –
called interest
– as specified
in a repayment
contract called
a bond, note,
bill or just
plain IOU, which
is debt.
In today's
economy, most
credit is lent,
so people often
use the terms
"credit" and
"debt"
interchangeably,
as money lent by
one entity is
simultaneously
money borrowed
by another.
When the
volume of money
and credit
rises
relative to the
volume of goods
available, the
relative value
of each unit of
money falls,
making prices
for goods
generally rise.
When the volume
of money and
credit falls
relative to the
volume of goods
available, the
relative value
of each unit of
money rises,
making prices of
goods generally
fall. Though
many people find
it difficult to
do, the proper
way to conceive
of these changes
is that the
value of units
of money
are rising and
falling, not the
values of goods.
The most
common
misunderstanding
about
inflation and
deflation –
echoed even by
some renowned
economists – is
the idea that
inflation is
rising prices
and deflation is
falling prices.
General price
changes, though,
are simply
effects of
inflation and
deflation.
The
price effects of
inflation
can occur in
goods, which
most people
recognize as
relating to
inflation, or in
investment
assets, which
people do not
generally
recognize as
relating to
inflation. The
inflation of the
1970s induced
dramatic price
rises in gold,
silver and
commodities. The
inflation of the
1980s and 1990s
induced dramatic
price rises in
stock
certificates and
real estate.
This difference
in effect is due
to differences
in the social
psychology that
accompanies
inflation and
disinflation,
respectively.
The
price effects of
deflation
are simpler.
They tend to
occur across the
board, in goods
and investment
assets
simultaneously.
…………….
For more
information on
deflation and
inflation,
including
money-saving
steps for
protecting your
wealth, download
Elliott Wave
International’s
free 8-page
report,
Inflation vs.
Deflation.
Robert
Prechter,
Certified Market
Technician, is
the founder and
CEO of Elliott
Wave
International,
author of Wall
Street
best-sellers
Conquer the
Crash and
Elliott Wave
Principle and
editor of The
Elliott Wave
Theorist monthly
market letter
since 1979. |
|
Has Cash Been King for the
Past 10 Years?
If you're like most
investors, you've been nearly
brainwashed with conventional
market "wisdom" that stocks are
the best way to grow your
portfolio.
You would be crazy not
to have your money in the
markets, right?
But when markets drop, as
we've seen in this credit
crisis, it's amazing how quickly
the story changes.
Steve Hochberg and Pete
Kendall, editors of Elliott Wave
International's Financial
Forecast, challenged the notion
of stocks' superiority years
before this latest downturn.
Learn how cash has been king
– and will remain so – far
longer than the latest news
headlines may have you believe
in this free excerpt from
Elliott Wave International's
Credit Crisis Survival Kit.
Elliott Wave International
has also made the full Credit
Crisis Survival Kit available
free for a limited time. In
addition to this excerpt, it
contains 14 other articles,
reports, and videos that reveal
how to survive and prosper
during the credit crisis.
Visit EWI to download the kit,
free.
Cash's Invisible
Reign Made Visible
[excerpted from Elliott Wave
Financial Forecast, August 2008]
With respect to cash and its
status as the preeminent
financial asset, however, we are
starting to wonder if investors
will ever come around to our
point of view, which, as we
explained in the March special
section, is that there are times
when "the phrase 'focus on the
long term' means "get out and
wait.'" As we also pointed out,
the last eight years are clearly
one of these times, as cash has
outperformed all three major
stock averages over this period.
A July 3 USA Today article shows
how this outlook is actually
becoming more farsighted as the
bear market intensifies:
3-month Treasuries Beat
S&P 500 for past 10 Years
The article says, "Investors
who bought stocks for the long
run are finding out just how
long the long run can be." But
the farther back in time cash's
dominance stretches and the
rockier the stock market gets,
the farther investors seem to
move from ever taking anything
off the table. After stating
that "there can be times, long
times, when stocks won't beat
T-bills," a professor and
popular buy-and-hold advocate is
cited as "optimistic that the
next 10 years will be better
than the past decade." In March
EWFF stated, "Cash will continue
to outperform until stocks are
no longer fashionable." There is
no sign that such a condition is
even close to happening.
It's somewhat amazing that
cash is not capturing anyone's
fancy because a tremendous
society-wide thirst for cash is
spreading fast. "In a
deflation," the Elliott Wave
Financial Forecast has stated,
"Rule No. 1 is to unload
everything that isn't nailed
down. Rule No. 2 is to sell
whatever everything remaining is
nailed to." The banking system
is surely deflating, because,
echoing Elliott Wave Financial
Forecast's wording again,
"Desperate American Banks Are
Selling Everything That Isn't
Nailed Down." SunTrust is
selling its stock in Coca-Cola,
an asset the bank held for 90
years. Merrill Lynch sold its
founding stake in Bloomberg as
well as various other
subsidiaries.
Meanwhile, "Americans are
selling prized possessions
online and at flea markets at
alarming rates." Pawnshops and
auction sites are booming. At
Craigslist.org, the number of
for-sale listings soared 70% in
eight months. This fits with our
review of Craigslist's prospects
when it was getting started in
2005: "This is just the set-up
phase. Once the global garage
sale really gets rolling, truly
astounding volumes of dirt-cheap
goods will be available on-line
and elsewhere." The global
garage sale is on. The chart of
the U.S. savings rate shows that
the bull market in cash has come
to life.

A 30-year downtrend in
savings rates ended at minus
2.3% in August 2005. In May
2008, the savings rate
skyrocketed to 5%. This jolt may
be somewhat overstated due to
the arrival of the government's
stimulus checks, but the burst
should be the start of a
critical new mindset among
consumers. When the government
showered the economy with $600
checks, many did something they
never would have thought of
through most of the bull market:
They put the money in the bank,
which is exactly what the
administration did not want. In
fact, federal, state and local
governments are desperate for
the tax revenue that a little
ripple-effect spending would
have generated.
According to the National
Conference of State
Legislatures, states must close
a $40 billion shortfall in the
current fiscal year. "The
problem today is that tax
revenue is vanishing," says a
story about the sudden
appearance of the worst fiscal
crisis in New York since 1975.
Even cities like East Hampton,
New York, where someone paid
$103 million for an oceanfront
house last year, are out of
money. "Nobody understands how
it happened," says one resident.
The pages of this newsletter
show otherwise. If we are right,
a deflationary decline is
depleting and destroying cash
flows in novel new ways that no
one alive has experienced
before. |
|
|
The
Primary
Precondition
of
Deflation
By
Robert
Prechter,
CMT
Elliott
Wave
International
The following was adapted from Bob Prechter’s 2002 New York Times and
Amazon
best
seller,
Conquer
the
Crash –
You Can
Survive
and
Prosper
in a
Deflationary
Depression.
Deflation
requires
a
precondition:
a major
societal
buildup
in the
extension
of
credit
(and its
flip
side,
the
assumption
of
debt).
Austrian
economists
Ludwig
von
Mises
and
Friedrich
Hayek
warned
of the
consequences
of
credit
expansion,
as have
a
handful
of other
economists,
who
today
are
mostly
ignored.
Bank
credit
and
Elliott
wave
expert
Hamilton
Bolton,
in a
1957
letter,
summarized
his
observations
this
way:
In
reading
a
history
of major
depressions
in the
U.S.
from
1830 on,
I was
impressed
with the
following:
(a)
All
were
set
off
by a
deflation
of
excess
credit.
This
was
the
one
factor
in
common.
(b)
Sometimes
the
excess-of-credit
situation
seemed
to
last
years
before
the
bubble
broke.
(c)
Some
outside
event,
such
as a
major
failure,
brought
the
thing
to a
head,
but
the
signs
were
visible
many
months,
and
in
some
cases
years,
in
advance.
(d)
None
was
ever
quite
like
the
last,
so
that
the
public
was
always
fooled
thereby.
(e)
Some
panics
occurred
under
great
government
surpluses
of
revenue
(1837,
for
instance)
and
some
under
great
government
deficits.
(f)
Credit
is
credit,
whether
non-self-liquidating
or
self-liquidating.
(g)
Deflation
of
non-self-liquidating
credit
usually
produces
the
greater
slumps.
Self-liquidating
credit
is a
loan
that is
paid
back,
with
interest,
in a
moderately
short
time
from
production.
Production
facilitated
by the
loan –
for
business
start-up
or
expansion,
for
example
–
generates
the
financial
return
that
makes
repayment
possible.
The full
transaction
adds
value to
the
economy.
Non-self-liquidating
credit
is a
loan
that is
not tied
to
production
and
tends to
stay in
the
system.
When
financial
institutions
lend for
consumer
purchases
such as
cars,
boats or
homes,
or for
speculations
such as
the
purchase
of stock
certificates,
no
production
effort
is tied
to the
loan.
Interest
payments
on such
loans
stress
some
other
source
of
income.
Contrary
to
nearly
ubiquitous
belief,
such
lending
is
almost
always
counter-productive;
it adds
costs
to the
economy,
not
value.
If
someone
needs a
cheap
car to
get to
work,
then a
loan to
buy it
adds
value to
the
economy;
if
someone
wants a
new SUV
to
consume,
then a
loan to
buy it
does not
add
value to
the
economy.
Advocates
claim
that
such
loans
"stimulate
production,"
but they
ignore
the cost
of the
required
debt
service,
which
burdens
production.
They
also
ignore
the
subtle
deterioration
in the
quality
of
spending
choices
due to
the
shift of
buying
power
from
people
who have
demonstrated
a
superior
ability
to
invest
or
produce
(creditors)
to those
who have
demonstrated
primarily
a
superior
ability
to
consume
(debtors).
Near
the end
of a
major
expansion,
few
creditors
expect
default,
which is
why they
lend
freely
to weak
borrowers.
Few
borrowers
expect
their
fortunes
to
change,
which is
why they
borrow
freely.
Deflation
involves
a
substantial
amount
of
involuntary
debt
liquidation
because
almost
no one
expects
deflation
before
it
starts.
For
more on
deflation,
including
the
following
topics,
see
Elliott
Wave
International’s
free
guide to
deflation,
inflation,
money,
credit
and debt.
There,
you can
also
download
two free
chapters
from
Conquer
the
Crash.
Learn
more
about
these
six
important
topics:
1.
What
is
Deflation
and
When
Does
it
Occur?
2.
Price
Effects
of
Inflation
and
Deflation
3.
The
Primary
Precondition
of
Deflation
4.
What
Triggers
the
Change
to
Deflation?
5.
Why
Deflationary
Crashes
and
Depressions
Go
Together
6.
Financial
Values
Can
Disappear
in
Deflation
Robert
Prechter,
Certified
Market
Technician,
is the
founder
and CEO
of
Elliott
Wave
International,
author
of Wall
Street
best
sellers
Conquer
the
Crash
and
Elliott
Wave
Principle
and
editor
of
The
Elliott
Wave
Theorist
monthly
market
letter
since
1979.
|
|
|
3 Questions The
Government Doesn’t Want You To
Ask About the Financial Crisis
(And 3 Shocking
Answers!)
September 22, 2008
Bob Prechter, President of
Elliott Wave International (EWI),
is no stranger to challenging
the status quo. His New York
Times bestseller, Conquer
the Crash, was published in
2002 before anyone was
even talking about the current
financial crisis.
In his recent 10-page market
letter, Prechter shifts his
focus to the government’s role
in the latest financial turmoil.
Elliott Wave International is
offering the full 10-page report
free if you’d like to read all
28 answers.
Visit EWI to download the full
report, free.
Here are 3 questions
excerpted from the free report:
1. Didn’t Congress create the
Federal Housing Authority,
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie
Mae and the Federal Home Loan
Banks for the purpose of helping
the public buy homes?
You’re kidding, right? What
happened is that clever
businessmen schemed with members
of Congress to create privileged
lending institutions so they
could get rich off the public’s
labor. In return, members of
Congress got big campaign
contributions from the
privileged corporations and, as
a bonus, even more votes. The
public’s welfare had nothing to
do with it.
Who celebrated when Congress
passed the latest housing bill?
Answer: “The California Mortgage
Bankers Association applauded
Congress for permanently
increasing the size of loans
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can
buy….” (USA, 7/28) The
legislation exists to “protect
the nation’s two largest
mortgage companies….” (NYT,
7/24) Who took out full-page ads
to encourage Congress to “enact
housing stimulus legislation
now”? Answer: the National
Association of Home Builders.
Who celebrated when the
administration “unveiled a new
set of best [sic] practices
designed to encourage banks to
issue a debt instrument known as
a covered bond”? Answer:
“[Treasury Secretary] Paulson
was joined at the news
conference by officials from the
Federal Reserve [and] the
Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation…. Officials from
banking giants Bank of America
Corp., Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan
Chase & Co. and Wells Fargo &
Co. issued a joint statement
saying, ‘We look forward to
being leading issuers’” (AP,
7/29) of covered bonds. And
voters still believe that
Congress is there to help the
needy.
2. Who cares if a bank goes
under? Won’t the FDIC protect
depositors?
The FDIC is not funded well
enough to bail out even a
handful of the biggest banks in
America. It has enough money to
pay depositors of about three
big banks. After that, it’s
broke. But here is the real
irony: The FDIC, as history will
ultimately demonstrate, causes
banks to fail. The FDIC creates
destruction three ways. First,
its very existence encourages
banks to take lending risks that
they would never otherwise
contemplate, while it
simultaneously removes
depositors’ incentives to keep
their bankers prudent. This
double influence produces an
unsound banking system. We have
reached that point today.
Second, the FDIC imposes costly
rules on banks. In July, it
“implemented a new
rule…requiring the 159 [largest]
banks to keep records that will
give quick access to customer
information.” As the American
Bankers Association puts it, the
new rule “will impose a lot of
burden on a lot of banks for no
reason.” (AJC, 7/19) Third, the
FDIC gets its money in the form
of “premiums” from—guess
whom?—healthy banks! So as weak
banks go under, the FDIC can
wring more money from
still-solvent banks. If it
begins calling in money during a
systemic credit implosion,
marginal banks will go under,
requiring more money for the
FDIC, which will have to take
more money from banks, breaking
more marginal banks, etc. The
FDIC could continue this
behavior until all banks are
bust, but it will more likely
give up and renege. Remember,
every government program
ultimately brings about the
opposite of the stated goal, and
the FDIC is no exception.
3. Who are the “homeowners”?
Everywhere you turn, news
articles are discussing how
Congress, the President and the
Fed are taking action to “help
homeowners.” People’s
understanding of this statement
is 100 percent wrong. The
homeowners in question are not
the residents of the houses. The
homeowners are banks. Unlike
some states, Georgia made its
law very specific on this point.
Our local paper recently
explained that, by recognizing
the reality of ownership,
“Georgia employs primarily a
nonjudicial foreclosure” and
therefore “has one of the
fastest procedures in the
country.” Specifically, “The
property owner gives the
mortgage holder a ‘security
deed’ or a ‘deed to secure
debt’. Technically, until the
debt is paid, in full, the
mortgage holder owns the
property and allows the borrower
to possess it.” (GT, 8/6) In
states where the mortgage holder
is deemed the property owner,
the title is merely a legal
technicality. The day he stops
making mortgage payments, he no
longer owns the property; the
bank does. After foreclosure,
many of those whom politicians
and the media call homeowners
will simply go from paying
interest to a bank to paying
rent to a landlord. For those
with little or no equity, it’s
not that big a deal. The real
devastation is happening in
banks’ portfolios, and banks,
not home-dwellers, are the ones
whom the government is trying to
rescue, at others’ expense.
One might be tempted to
charge therefore that Congress
makes its laws for the purpose
of helping banks. This idea,
too, is incorrect. Helping banks
is merely a side effect. The
reason that Congress creates
privileges for bankers is to
benefit politicians. They make
laws in response to campaign
contributions from lending
institutions, real-estate
organizations and builders’
associations. They also garner
votes from mortgage holders and,
miraculously, from voters who
think that their
“representatives” are being
“compassionate.”
The previous 3 questions and
answers from Bob Prechter were
excerpted from his recent
10-page market letter, The
Elliott Wave Theorist.
Elliott Wave International is
offering the full 10-page report
free if you’d like to read all
28 answers.
Visit EWI to download the full
report, free. |
|
|
Gold, the Dow, T-Notes: Which Does Best During
Recessions?
By Susan C. Walker,
Elliott Wave
International
April 11, 2008
Each year, the NCAA
college basketball
tournament winnows its
starting field of 64
teams to the Final Four
teams who play for a
chance to become the
national champion.
Congratulations to the
University of Kansas and
the University of
Tennessee, this year's
men's and women's
basketball champions.
The structure of the
NCAA tournament got me
to thinking. Wouldn't it
be great if we could set
up brackets for our own
investments the same way
– start with 64
equities, bonds, mutual
funds, commodity
futures, metals, etc.
Then let them duke it
out against one another
to see which ones emerge
as the "Investment Final
Four"?
Click here to download a
free 5-page report
from Elliott Wave
International with even
more information on
which investment does
best during recessions.
The report, excerpted
from Bob Prechter's
Elliott Wave Theorist,
includes in-depth
historical analysis and
six eye-opening tables.
Since most of us have
neither the time nor the
money to act as our own
version of the NCAA
(which might stand for
the "National
Coordinator of Asset
Allocation"), it's worth
knowing that Bob
Prechter of Elliott Wave
International has
already set his mind to
the task. He has
specifically explored
which investments do
best in times of
recession and which do
best during economic
expansions. But instead
of starting with a field
of 64 investments, he
researched the three
most popular investments
– gold, the Dow, and
Treasury bonds. We can
call them the Treasured
Three, rather than the
Final Four.
Gold and
Recessions
Since economists and
even Ben Bernanke,
chairman of the Federal
Reserve, now admit that
it looks like the U.S.
economy has entered a
recession, many people
may wonder whether they
need to change the mix
of their investments. In
particular, as some
prices keep going up –
notably for food and gas
– the threat of
inflation makes people
more interested in gold
as an investment, since
it's usually seen as a
bulwark against monetary
inflation.
It is this
conventional wisdom that
piqued Prechter's
curiosity. He wanted to
find out whether it
would hold up to a
reality test. As he
writes in The
Elliott Wave Theorist,
"I have often read,
'Gold always goes up in
recessions and
depressions.' Is it
true? Should you own
gold because you think
the economy is tanking?
Whenever we hear some
claim like this, we
always do the same
thing: We look at the
data."
So he and another
Elliott wave analyst ran
the numbers, reviewing
the behavior of these
three key investments
during recessions
following World War II,
from February 1945
through November 2001.
This is what they
learned:
Gold was
not the best investment
during recessions in
terms of total return.
The winner of this
tournament was actually
Treasury Notes, which
had a total return of
9.96%. In contrast, gold
had a total return of
8.80%, and the Dow came
in at 6.89%. But that's
not all – once they
figured in the
transaction costs for
each investment (at a
2008 level), gold fell
from second to third
place as a worthwhile
investment during
recessions. The total
returns with transaction
costs came out this way:
|
1. T-Notes
|
9.82% |
|
2. Dow |
6.85% |
|
3. Gold |
4.80% |
This result turns
conventional wisdom on
its head. It's also
worth being aware of as
you invest in 2008.
Here's how Prechter sums
up the results:
The Best
Investment During
Recessions
The most
important question,
however, is not
whether the Dow beat
gold or vice versa
but whether making
either investment
would have been
better than taking
no risk at all.
Table 3 [see
free report
provided by Elliott
Wave International]
shows that ten-year
Treasury notes beat
both gold and the
Dow during
recessions since
1945, and they
did so far more
reliably.
T-notes provided a
capital gain in 10
of the 11
recessions, and of
course they provided
interest income
during all of them.
And the transaction
costs are low….
So if you want to
make money
reliably and safely
during recessions
and depression, you
should own bonds
whose issuers will
remain fully
reliable debtors
throughout the
contraction. Of
course, as
Conquer the Crash
[Editor's note: Bob
Prechter's
best-selling
business book] makes
abundantly clear,
finding such bonds
in this depression,
which will be the
deepest in 300
years, will not be
easy. Conquer
the Crash
forecast that in
this depression most
bonds will go down
and many will go to
zero. This process
has already begun.
This time around,
you have to follow
the suggestions in
that book to make
your debt investment
work. [The
Elliott Wave
Theorist, March
2008]
Susan C. Walker
writes for
Elliott Wave
International, a
market forecasting and
technical analysis
company. She has been an
associate editor with
Inc. magazine, a
newspaper writer and
editor, an investor
relations executive and
a speechwriter for the
Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta. Her columns
also appear regularly on
FoxNews.com.
Suddenly, It's a Bleak Midwinter for Housing and Lending
By Susan C. Walker, Elliott Wave International
January 7, 2008
In the bleak midwinter,
Frosty wind made moan,
Earth stood hard as iron,
Water like a stone…
(From "A Christmas Carol" by Christina Rossetti)
Shawn Colvin sings a beautiful song based on this poem by Christina Rossetti, reminding us of the bleakness of midwinter. That is exactly where the housing market seems to be now – facing its very own bleak midwinter of falling prices, rising mortgage rates and growing inventories.
The latest report of the S&P/Case-Shiller home price index shows that the price of houses fell 6.7% in October, year over year. That is the largest year-to-year decline drop since April 1991. Think of it – if you had bought a home for $300,000 in October 2006, it is now worth about $280,000. And suppose you just got a new job and need to move? You are going to have trouble selling it at that price, too, thanks to so many foreclosed homes on the market. One realtor in Phoenix explained to a Wall Street Journal reporter that local residents are now competing with foreclosed homes selling for $50,000 to $100,000 less than other houses on the market. "The sellers now are having to reduce their prices by 20% to 30% to compete," she says. (Wall Street Journal, "Pace of Decline in Home Prices Sets a Record," 12/27/07)
At a meeting of the New York Society of Security Analysts on January 7, U.S. Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson said this about the U.S. economy: "We will likely have further indications of slower growth in the weeks and months ahead.''
Paulson and central bankers at the U.S. Federal Reserve recognize that they, too, face their own bleak financial midwinter. It's not just the mayhem brought on by the subprime mortgage debacle, the implosion of the housing market and the ensuing credit crunch; nor is it that the U.S. economy lurches toward a recession and hard times.
No, it is something bigger than that. Public opinion or social mood, as we call it here at Elliott Wave International, has shifted from positive to negative. When that happens, financial heroes find themselves falling from their pedestals onto frozen earth hard as iron.
Exhibit A - The headline of a recent article on Bloomberg: "Paulson Gets Diminishing Return with Bush, Like Powell, O'Neill" and the lead: "Henry Paulson escaped the Nixon White House with his reputation enhanced. He won't be so lucky this time around."
Exhibit B - The lead from a recent column by David Ignatius in the Washington Post:
"When airport rescue crews are worried that a damaged plane may have a crash landing, they sometimes spread the runway with foam to reduce the probability of fire on impact. That's what the Federal Reserve and other central banks are doing in pumping liquidity into severely damaged financial markets. Make no mistake: The central bankers' announcement Wednesday of a new coordinated effort to pump cash into the global financial system is a sign of their nervousness…."
Nervousness is in the air now. Investors are anxious about the markets; everyone is worried about the housing market. Our Elliott Wave Financial Forecast December issue explains how housing starts (and stops) are intimately tied to recessions: "One key indicator of success in pre-dating economic downturns is housing starts, which are approaching the 1-million-a-month level that has preceded all recessions of the last 40 years."
And the Fed is nervous, too. So much so that it announced a credit giveaway with four other major central banks (the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank) in mid-December to try to bolster the financial system and the banks that keep it humming. The Fed reports that banks have been stepping up to its auction window each week to purchase $20 billion. Unfortunately for the banks, most of this "liquidity" isn't that liquid. It has to be paid back within 30 days, with interest of about 4.65%.
Editor's note: Elliott Wave International has agreed to make available to our readers a 2-1/2-page excerpt from Bob Prechter's Elliott Wave Theorist in which he describes exactly how the Fed's latest effort to shore up banks' balance sheets has become "High Noon for the Fed's Credibility." Click here to read the Theorist excerpt.
Just how bleak is the future for central bankers if this recently implemented plan doesn't work? Bob Prechter explains in his just-published Theorist:
"Nevertheless, this is probably the single most important central-bank pronouncement yet. But it is not significant for the reasons people think. By far most people take such pronouncements at face value, presume that what the authorities promise will happen and reason from there. But the tremendous significance of this seismic engagement of the monetary jawbone is that if this announcement fails to restore confidence, central bankers' credibility will evaporate."
"At least that's the way historians will play it. But of course, the true causality, as elucidated by socionomics, is that an evaporation of confidence will make the central bankers' plans fail. The outcome is predicated on psychology."
The "socionomics" Prechter refers to is a new social science he has introduced that studies how humans behave in groups within contexts of uncertainty – where fluctuations in social mood motivate social actions. It explains that rather than an event happening that affects social mood (for example, falling home prices make people feel bad), what really happens is that social mood changes first from positive to negative and then lousy things happen (for example, unhappy people make home prices fall). If you can adopt this point of view, then you can see that, in poetic terms, we are fast approaching a bleak midwinter for the economy and the financial markets.
Susan C. Walker writes for Elliott Wave International, a market forecasting and technical analysis company. She has been an associate editor with Inc. magazine, a newspaper writer and editor, an investor relations executive and a speechwriter for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Her columns also appear regularly on FoxNews.com. |
|
|
Subprime Delivers One-Two Punch
Just Like Hurricane Katrina Did
By Susan C. Walker, Elliott Wave International
November 29, 2007
The world is awash in bad news about the subprime mortgage meltdown, just the same way that New Orleans was awash in floodwaters from Hurricane Katrina two summers ago. A few examples:
- The median price for new home drops 13% since last year, the most in 37 years, according to a Census Bureau report on November 29. This due in large part to buyers not being able to get financing now that lenders have tightened their lending standards in response to the subprime debacle.
- Major Wall Street banks write off billions of dollars in subprime-backed securities.
- Dire forecasts estimate that the credit crunch caused by the mortgage problems will cause between $250 billion to $500 billion of losses at banks and brokerages before it's done.
If you want to see how this kind of news looks on a price chart, consider the chart that we published in the latest Elliott Wave Financial Forecast. It shows how confidence in the mortgage market has simply fallen off a cliff. "The ABX Mortgage Indexes are akin to the eerie music that starts to play right before the goriest scenes in a horror movie," write our analysts Steve Hochberg and Pete Kendall. Even prime-rated mortgages (the top line on the chart) seem to have been tainted by the cliff-diving exploits of the subprime and Alt-A mortgage indexes.

Editor's note: Elliott Wave International invites you to read more about this Mortgage Mutiny chart in a special three-page excerpt from the November 2007 Elliott Wave Financial Forecast, called "Transition to a Fear of Risk."
The continuing repercussions of the subprime meltdown since two Bear Stearns' hedge funds imploded in August remind me how closely this situation imitates the delayed punch of Hurricane Katrina in the summer of 2005. In fact, I wrote a column for Fox News on that very topic a few months ago, some of which is worth repeating.
* * * * *
[Excerpted from "Subprime Storm Mimics Katrina," originally published July 30, 2007]
Wall Street may have reason to worry about a financial hurricane poised to do the same kind of damage Hurricane Katrina did — in terms of money and assets lost — in New Orleans in 2005. Given the latest storm warnings about subprime mortgages and the Dow’s dive last week, it looks like "Subprime Katrina" might become the financial storm of the decade.
Wall Street investment bankers who remember the devastation in New Orleans might want to start battening down the hatches. In fact, some of them seem to understand their pending doom as they try to cajole the rest of the world into thinking that the subprime (otherwise known as low-quality) mortgage contagion is contained. 'Sure, sure, Bear Stearns got hit when its subprime hedge funds lost their value, but everyone else is O.K.,' they say. 'Let's all heave one collective sigh of relief that we dodged that bullet.'
Does that attitude sound familiar? It's exactly how the people of New Orleans felt for the 8-10 hours after Hurricane Katrina whipped up the Gulf Coast and dumped its rain. It was over; they had dodged the bullet. Their beautiful city that is built below sea level and surrounded by sea walls and levees was safe. That's where Wall Street is right now – hoping the levees will hold as investment bankers try to sandbag the rest of us with lots of placating talk. Well, it turns out that New Orleans was about as safe as the subprime bonds that are now below their own "C" level.
Although Wall Street bankers have been doing one heckuva job, I think it's too soon to breathe easy, just as it was too soon for those in the Big Easy to breathe easy. Here's why: Wall Street was warned about the coming hurricane-force fall-out from subprime mortgages, and it ignored the warnings, buying up all the securities backed by subprime mortgages that it could. Now, Wall Street is having trouble selling more debt. It sounds like it may be too late for many Wall Street denizens to get out of town – and their positions – before the floodwaters start rising.
Remember, too, the finger-pointing and blaming that started as soon as the rest of the nation realized that the U.S. government was not doing enough to help New Orleans? The editors of The Elliott Wave Financial Forecast recognize a similar change in attitudes toward Wall Street:
"The unwinding process will be sped along by a flood of revelations about illicit hedge fund and investment banking activities. Just as Enron, Tyco and a host of other primary beneficiaries of the late 1990s bull market run became the focus of scandals, hedge funds and the banks that enabled them are starting to become a focal point for scrutiny." (The Elliott Wave Financial Forecast, July 2007)
Then will come the final installment. Just as the U.S. government was slow to come to grips with the disaster in New Orleans so that people were left to fend for themselves, so too will investment bankers and investors have to fend for themselves. They may find themselves clutching their worthless paper and wishing someone would bail them out from the rooftops of their now-worthless homes.
* * * * *
Now, here we are at the end of November, and the situation for investors and investment banks has played out almost exactly as I outlined. Hardly anyone is coming out smelling like a rose. If anything it's the opposite, as the stench from quarterly financial filings rises as banks reveal how many billions in dollars they must write off for their mortgage investments gone bad. Sadly, the conclusion to my Subprime Katrina column still holds true: "Heckuva Job Brownie – now known as Helicopter Ben Bernanke and his Federal Reserve team – won't have any more luck picking up the pieces on Wall Street than FEMA did in New Orleans."
Susan C. Walker writes for Elliott Wave International, a market forecasting and technical analysis company. She has been an associate editor with Inc. magazine, a newspaper writer and editor, an investor relations executive and a speechwriter for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Her columns also appear regularly on FoxNews.com. |
|
|
How To Recognize a Financial Mania When You're Smack Dab in the Middle of One
By Susan C. Walker, Elliott Wave International
November 12, 2007
When you're caught in the middle of a bad storm, you don't really care whether it's a tropical depression or a full-strength hurricane. You just know you're hanging on for dear life. The same idea applies to financial markets. When a market is trending up strongly, it's hard to tell whether it's just a bull market or a more dangerous financial mania.
The recent tremendous ride up for global and U.S. financial markets, including the Dow, looks and feels more like a mania than a mere bull, says Elliott Wave International analyst Peter Kendall. This distinction is important to recognize in the rising stage, because manias always result in a crash that takes them back beneath their starting point.
Kendall recently published his research into current financial manias throughout the world in SFO (Stocks, Futures and Options) magazine. The article, titled "Financial Manias and the Trade of a Lifetime," suggests an even more stunning finish for the current manias: "The speed and global scope of the unfolding credit crisis suggest that most of the fast-rising markets of the last decade will crash in unison," he writes.
Editor's note: Elliott Wave International invites you to read the full five-page article with charts from the October 2007 SFO magazine by Elliott Wave International's Pete Kendall called "Financial Manias and the Trade of a Lifetime."
As co-editor of The Elliott Wave Financial Forecast, Kendall searches for trends that help traders to move in and out of markets. By comparing other historic manias with the impressive rise of the DJIA since the late 1970s, he focuses on the skyscraper pattern that they all have in common. The four historical manias are the Dutch Tulip mania of the 1630s, the South Sea bubble of 1720, the U.S. stock crash of 1921-1932 and the dot.com bust of the 1990s and early 2000s. Once you can see the similarities, you will be better prepared to face the music when the crash comes. As Kendall writes, "once the belief that the markets will always rise becomes widespread, it actually signals the start of a price swing that tends to be a career-breaker for any trader who tries to oppose it."
He also discusses current manias, such as the Nikkei, which has yet to return to its start after a manic rise to its all-time high in December 1989, and the Dow, which reversed from its rise in 2000 but made a U-turn in 2002. The starting point for the Dow's mania as shown in the chart included in the article is at the 1000 level.
Kendall, who is also writing a book about financial manias, titled The Mania Chronicles, describes five telltale signs that help an investor to tell the difference between a regular bull market and a mania. It's a mania if:
1. There is no upside resistance, and rising prices seem to be perpetual.
2. Everyone in the market looks like an expert.
3. There is a flight from quality investments to riskier investments.
4. As financial bubbles pop in one area, they bubble up in others.
5. The crash after the peak takes back all the gains the mania made.
No. 5 can be viewed only with hindsight. But the first four signs provide essential clues to what's shaping up in the markets.
"By studying past mania experiences, traders can gain valuable insight into the collective emotions that drive their markets," writes Kendall. "It's possible to make significant money in the advancing stages of a mania with no knowledge of its existence. But there is nothing like recognizing a mania for what it is in real time to help a trader keep those gains and deal with the relentless crash after it peaks."
In the last part of the SFO article, he asks the key question, Are we at the peak yet? Find out his answer by reading the whole article for yourself.
Susan C. Walker writes for Elliott Wave International, a market forecasting and technical analysis company. She has been an associate editor with Inc. magazine, a newspaper writer and editor, an investor relations executive and a speechwriter for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Her columns also appear regularly on FoxNews.com. |
|
|
Wanted: Prime Suspect of Housing Market Murder
By Susan C. Walker, Elliott Wave International
October 8, 2007
Helen Mirren accepted her Emmy award for best actress in the mini-series, "Prime Suspect" with elegance and grace. Just the opposite of the tough detective superintendent character she plays who tracks down murder suspects in England. Who would Jane Tennison pick out as the prime suspect for the murder of the U.S. housing market and the resulting gruesome credit crunch?
Suspect No. 1 – Phil Spector
No – sorry, wrong case, wrong suspect. Spector has been on trial for the murder of a guest at his home (the judge declared a mistrial this week), but Spector has nothing to do with the subprime mortgage fallout and ensuing credit crunch. O.J. Simpson, who stands accused of trying to "recover" his sports memorabilia, is not the prime suspect either. If the crime doesn't fit, you must acquit.
Suspect No. 2 – Alan Greenspan
Says that he didn't catch on for a few years that subprime mortgages could create a problem for the economy. As chairman of the Federal Reserve, he let easy credit ride, which facilitated the housing bubble and the subsequent implosion. Could liken his behavior to supplying the gun to a rampaging murderer. Guilty of aiding and abetting, but he's not necessarily the prime suspect.
Suspect No. 3 – Angelo Mozilo
Angelo Mozilo, CEO of Countrywide Financial (largest mortgage company in the United States), says he kept his staff writing subprime mortgages day and night, because if they didn't, then home purchasers would just find someone else to give them a low-quality mortgage. Company went from writing 4.6% of its overall mortgages as subprimes and low-documentation loans in 2004 to 8.7% in 2006. Guilty of greed and a poor business plan but not murder.
Suspect No. 4 – S. & P. and Moody's
Oh, whoops, say these rating agencies, we thought that once you sliced up a BBB security thinly enough and packaged it with other more desirable collateralized debt obligations that we could call it AAA. Did we mislead anybody? Again, aiding and abetting but not a prime suspect.
Suspect No. 5 – Goldman Sachs and other investment banks
Says that their investors wanted higher returns and that collateralized debt obligations spiced up with subprime mortgages served the purpose. And besides, they say, the rating agencies gave them an excellent rating. Guilty of acting like a fence but not the prime murder suspect.
The True Prime Suspect
All of these are worth a look as suspects, but the true prime suspect has neither a first name nor a last. It's known as "social mood," and its m.o. is "herding behavior." That's our real murderer, the one that quashed the hopes and dreams of those who believed that house prices would always go up. Social mood changed, and with it changed the idea of what were smart financing moves to purchase a house. Suddenly, as house prices began to fall and subprime mortgagees began to default on their loans, the stick house built on low-quality mortgages seemed like a really bad idea.
Who knew? When social mood was positive, mortgage writers pushed people who couldn't really afford a mortgage into believing they could. Then they sold the mortgages to eager investment bankers who sliced them up into small packages of risk and re-packaged them with less risky securities. Then the ratings agencies gave their stamp of approval: AA? Why not AAA? And eager investors who wanted higher returns bought them up.
But now the game is up. When social mood turns from positive to negative, fear replaces greed, and people begin to see the riskiness for what it is. When social mood changes from positive to negative, markets turn from bullish to bearish. And no one can stop it – not even the Fed.
This is how Bob Prechter, president of Elliott Wave International, describes the phenomenon:
"Like credit inflation, credit deflation is in fact an intricate, interwoven process, whose initial impetus is a change in social mood from optimism toward pessimism. If you are still on the fence about this idea, ask yourself: What changed in the so-called “fundamentals” between June and August? The answer is: absolutely nothing. Interest rates did not budge; there were no indications of recession; there were no changes in bank lending policies; there were no chilling government edicts.
"The only thing that changed was people’s minds. One day sub-prime mortgages were a fine investment, and the next day they were toxic waste. There was no external cause of the change.… According to socionomic theory, the stock market is a sensitive indicator of such changes in mood. This is why The Elliott Wave Theorist has continually said that the financial structure will hold up as long as the stock market rises. A downturn occurred in mid-July, and its consequences in terms of negative social mood are becoming swiftly evident. Remember, C waves (see Elliott Wave Principle, Chapter 2) are when optimistic illusions finally disappear and fear takes over. Sounds like now." [Elliott Wave Theorist, September 2007]
How To Protect Yourself from the Prime Suspect Who is Still on the Loose
Social mood has turned ugly and is likely to continue its murderous rampage, leaving the policymakers helpless. As analysts Steve Hochberg and Pete Kendall write in The Elliott Wave Financial Forecast: "The Fed does not "inject" liquidity; it only offers it. If nobody wants it, the inflation game is over. The determinant of that matter is the market. When bull markets turn to bear, confidence turns to fear, and a fearful people do not lend or borrow at the same rates as confident ones. The ultimate drivers of inflation and deflation are human mental states that the Fed cannot manipulate."
What should you do to protect yourself in this time of falling home prices, a powerless Fed and a contracting economy? Bob Prechter wrote one of the best how-to books. It's his business best-seller, titled, Conquer the Crash, How To Survive and Prosper in a Deflationary Depression. You might want to start there.
Editor's Note: You can read a FREE 9-page chapter from Conquer the Crash –
You will learn the implications of the massive credit expansion, what triggers the change from boom times to recession, and more.
Susan C. Walker writes for Elliott Wave International, a market forecasting and technical analysis company. She has been an associate editor with Inc. magazine, a newspaper writer and editor, an investor relations executive and a speechwriter for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Her columns also appear regularly on FoxNews.com. |
|
|
Why the Fed is Such a Lousy Wizard of Oz
By Susan C. Walker, Elliott Wave International
September 7, 2007
Central bankers who "follow the yellow brick road" end up in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, every Labor Day weekend for their annual symposium sponsored by – who else? – the Kansas City Fed. (Who can forget Judy Garland saying to her little dog, "Toto, I've got a feeling we're not in Kansas anymore," in the 1939 movie, The Wizard of Oz?)
The Jackson Hole Resort serves as the Federal Reserve's equivalent of the Emerald City, as Fed governors and presidents meet with central bankers and economists from around the world to discuss economic issues. This year, the symposium focused on housing and monetary policy. Usually, the Fed chairman kicks off the symposium and, this year, the new chairman, Ben S. Bernanke, did the honors. He closed his speech with these words:
"The interaction of housing, housing finance, and economic activity has for years been of central importance for understanding the behavior of the economy, and it will continue to be central to our thinking as we try to anticipate economic and financial developments."
Then came the other speeches. And it seems that some of the guests in Emerald City were waiting for their chance to pull back the curtain and prove that the Wonderful Wizard of Oz isn't such a wizard after all. Bloomberg reported that "Federal Reserve officials, wrestling with a housing recession that jeopardizes U.S. growth, got an earful from critics at a weekend retreat, arguing they should use regulation and interest rates to prevent asset-price bubbles." Apparently, one academic paper presented at Jackson Hole graded the Fed an 'F' for the way it has handled the repercussions from the rise and fall of the housing market.
Truth be told, these folks are a little late to the table as critics of the Fed. We're glad they're joining us, but here's what they still haven't learned: It isn't because the Federal Reserve messes up by allowing credit, asset and stock bubbles to form that it's not a wizard. The Federal Reserve isn't a wizard for one particular reason that it doesn't want anybody to know – and that is that the Fed doesn't lead the financial markets, it follows them.
People everywhere want to believe in the Fed's wizardry. But all this talk about how the Fed will be able to help the U.S. economy and hold up the markets by cutting rates now is as much hooey as the Wizard of Oz promising Dorothy, the Scarecrow, the Tin Man and the Cowardly Lion that he could give them what they wanted: a return to Kansas, a brain, a heart, and courage. Because when the Fed does do something, it always comes after the markets have already made their moves.
If you don't believe it, you should look at one chart from the most recent Elliott Wave Financial Forecast. It compares the movements in the Fed Funds rate with the movements of the 3-month U.S. Treasury Bill Yield. What does it reveal? That the Fed has followed the T-Bill yield up and down every step of the way since 2000. And the interesting question becomes this: Since the T-bill yield has dropped nearly two points since February, how soon will the Fed cut its rate to follow the market's lead this time?
[Editor's note: You can see this chart and read the Special Section it appears in by accessing the free report, The Unwonderful Wizardry of the Fed.]
We've got our own brains, heart and courage here at Elliott Wave International, and we've used them to explain over and over again that putting faith in the Fed to turn around the markets and the economy is blind faith indeed.
"This blind faith in the Fed's power to hold up the economy and stocks epitomizes the following definition of magic offered by Teller of the illusionist and comedy team of Penn and Teller: a 'theatrical linking of a cause with an effect that has no basis in physical reality, but that – in our hearts – ought to be.'" [September 2007, The Elliott Wave Financial Forecast]
Because, you see, what makes the markets move has less to do with what the unwizardly Fed does and more with changes in the mass psychology of all the people investing in those markets. The Elliott Wave Principle describes how bullish and bearish trends in the financial markets reflect changes in social mood, from positive to negative and back again. To extend the metaphor: The Fed can't affect social mood anymore than the Wonderful Wizard of Oz could change the direction of the wind that brought his hot air balloon to the Land of Oz in the first place.
As our EWI analysts write, "With respect to the timing of the Federal Reserve Board rate cuts, we need to reiterate one key point. The market, not the Fed, sets rates." Being able to understand this information puts you one step closer to clicking your ruby red shoes together and whispering those magic words: "There's no place like home." Once you land back in Kansas, your eyes will open, and you will see that an unwarranted faith in the Fed was just a bad dream.
Susan C. Walker writes for Elliott Wave International, a market forecasting and technical analysis company. She has been an associate editor with Inc. magazine, a newspaper writer and editor, an investor relations executive and a speechwriter for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Her columns also appear regularly on FoxNews.com. |
|
|
Subprime's New Song: The Worst Is Yet To Come
By Susan C. Walker, Elliott Wave International
August 28, 2007
Remember that catchy love song that Frank Sinatra made popular in the 1960s, "The Best Is Yet To Come"?
"The best is yet to come and, babe, won't that be fine?
You think you've seen the sun, but you ain't seen it shine."
At the risk of mixing musical metaphors and styles, it looks more like the sun has deserted us right now in the financial markets, and we're about to see "The Dark Side of the Moon," the title of Pink Floyd's 1973 smash album. With the subprime mortgage problems reaching farther and farther out to touch hedge funds, U.S. and European banks, mortgage companies and money-market funds, what we're going to experience sounds more like "The Worst is Yet To Come."
That's because the financial markets must contend not only with the credit crunch brought on by rising foreclosures now; they must also deal with the repercussions from more foreclosures over the next 18 months as more adjustable-rate mortgages (whether subprime or not) reset from low teaser rates to higher interest-rate levels.
How bad can it get? Investment adviser John Mauldin recently published a month-by-month account of the dollar amount of mortgages that will be reset through 2008, and the largest reset amounts pop up in the first six months of next year. In fact, as he points out, the $197 billion of mortgage resets so far this year is "less than we will see in two months (February and March) of next year. The first six months of next year will see more than the total for 2007, or $521 billion."
So, we haven't even begun to feel the pain yet. It's bad enough for the folks who will find that they can't keep up with the higher mortgage payments and will have to move out of their homes. But the financial markets won't be catching a break either. The antiseptic phrase used to describe the situation is "repricing risk." That means that investors have woken up to the fact that the AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities and derivatives they invested in look more like junk bonds now. This eye-opener causes them to want higher yields from what they now see as riskier vehicles.
That new investor caution plays out this way: investment banks, hedge funds and any other entity that bought securities backed by subprime loans now find it hard to sell the darn things. It's almost the same as homeowners trying to find buyers for their homes – nearly impossible in a market where home prices are falling. In the financial markets, it's nearly impossible because no one even wants to attach a price to a collateralized debt obligation today for fear that it will be priced much lower tomorrow.
The Fed can try to calm such fears all it wants by lowering the discount rate and giving banks more time to pay back loans (from overnight to 30 days), but the real problem can't be fixed with more access to credit. The fact is nobody wants any more of that. What they really want is cash to pay off their debts, be it a mortgage or an unwinding of a securities bet.
Wall Street's denizens are in the dark about how much their schemes depend on the ocean of liquidity created by the bull market, say Elliott Wave International's analysts, Steve Hochberg and Pete Kendall. They are particularly struck by the image of the Grim Reaper that Business Week magazine put on its cover recently with the headline, "Death Bonds:"
"The grim reaper is the perfect visage to welcome the arriving wave of liquidation; it will wreak havoc with their work. The field's dark fate is clear in one fund manager's description of what caused 'forced sales' at another fund: 'The models work when they look at history, but not when history is all new.' What's 'new' is that for the first time in the experience of many model makers, confidence is on the run. As they rob Peter to pay Paul, all assets will be impacted in negative ways that do not compute in their models." (The Elliott Wave Financial Forecast, August 2007)
And the bad news just keeps accumulating:
- Housing prices dropped 3.2% percent in the second quarter compared with last year, the largest drop since Standard & Poor's started tracking home prices in 1987.
- CIT Group closed its mortgage unit this week, while Lehman Brothers closed its own last week. Mortgage companies that specialize in low-quality mortgages are either going out of business (London-based HSBC) or struggling (California-based Countrywide).
- The Wall Street Journal lists the number of fired employees at seven mortgage companies, including First Magnus (6,000), Capitol One's Greenpoint (1,900), Associated Home Lenders (1,600) and Lehman (1,200), which totals more than 12,000 suddenly unemployed mortgage writers.
To top it off, Bloomberg reports that the subprime mess may lead to lower bonuses for the first time in five years on Wall Street, according to Options Group, a company that's been tracking this kind of information for a decade.
Somewhere, the world's smallest violin is playing a sad song for the fund managers and investment bankers who won't be taking home that million-dollar-plus bonus this year. And Frank Sinatra is singing a sad refrain… "The worst is yet to come."
Susan C. Walker writes for Elliott Wave International, a market forecasting and technical analysis company. She has been an associate editor with Inc. magazine, a newspaper writer and editor, an investor relations executive and a speechwriter for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Her columns also appear regularly on FoxNews.com.
For more information on the housing market and the credit crisis, access the free report, “The Real State of Real Estate,” from Elliott Wave International.
|
|
|
|
|
|
View our Privacy and Internet Security Policy
guppytraders.com Pty Ltd, ACN 089 941 560
|
 |
|